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IN THE UTA1 i O >URT ()!- APPi'M S 
THE STATE 01- UTAH. : 
v. : 
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO, : Case No. 20050899-CA 
l Attendant/ Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
First, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive terms of 
probation because uu ! .egislature has not a.uhoi 1/..J imposition of consecutive 
probiifionurv tepnv Av exphiinc-i ifi l\'ir' I 'Ids iv,f.., ;.. 'ippropriafe for review ivrause 
the record shows the trial court imposed consecutive terms of probation, not just one long 
probationary term; this Court is free to address the issue because it was not decided by 
C
 tti * XUK „• . . . M a l e v . v'\ i i i u a j " . '" ' * * . -p * , ! .'.* 
remedy for this error is to reverse and remand with an order for the trial court to run the 
probationary terms concurrently, 
Second, the probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, -. .,; ... • -,.JM.- S-.\C • 
process. A s explained in Pai t II Candedo is not required tomake a threshold showing 
that the probation statute implicates a fundamental rinla. ifb; Court should reverse 
because the probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace.
 n no i r a t iona l ly r c k u c d to 





- -* ' ' ' " 
Wallace was issued after Candedo was sentenced, this issue is appropriate for review 
under either rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS CANDEDO'S ARGUMENT 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
SENTENCING HIM TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF PROBATION 
AND SHOULD CORRECT THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR BY 
REMANDING WITH AN ORDER TO RUN THE PROBATIONARY 
TERMS CONCURRENTLY 
The Separation of Powers Clause of the Utah Constitution prevents trial courts 
from imposing a sentence that has not been authorized by the Utah Legislature. See Aplt. 
Br. at 10-12. As explained in Candedo5s opening brief, the Legislature has not 
authorized imposition of consecutive terms of probation. See Aplt. Br. at 10-18. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing three consecutive 
probationary terms of 36 months each, resulting in a total probationary period of 108 
months. See Aplt. Br. at 10-18. 
As explained below, this Court should reach the merits of this issue because the 
record shows the trial court imposed consecutive terms of probation rather than one long 
probationary period, meaning this issue is either properly preserved or appropriate for 
review under rule 22(e). See infra Part LA. Moreover, this Court is free to address this 
issue as a matter of first impression because our supreme court did not decide the issue in 
Wallace. See infra Part LB. Finally, the appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand 
with an order to run Candedo's probationary terms concurrently. See infra Part I.C. 
2 
, i,, I his Court Should Reach mv Aiurus of Candedo's Argument Because HIT 
Trial Court Imposed Consecutive Terms of Probation, Candedo Preserved 
the Issue for Appeal, and Imposition of Consecutive Probationary Terms 
Constitutes an Illegal Sentence that Warrants Correction Under Rule 22(e). 
t Jnlike '"Vv allace, tl le record ii 1 tl: lis case si low s the trial coi irt sei ltei iced Cat idedo to 
three consecutive probationary terms of thirty-six months each. In Wallace, our supreme 
courl determined die trial \.ouri imposed one long probationer, period, not several slu-rlcr 
terms ;iua A-uia run consecmo .;\. Male \. Wallace. _!'••*• • : v • -. ^ 
The:! ^ . r i h i •• •
 : .. • -;;• ; ' \ :i\r<) o•'pp-balion/ it did not 
assert that the probationary period was composed of consecutive terms or define the 
length of each indw siual term, Id. at ** Instead, n "'explained tii.;. •>> was setting an 
e \ t L - 4 • r - T - . ' • > i - : ; ^ * .„^\ ; I ; L ; '-\ •. •* . -:\ \ 
opportunity as possible to make restitution payments/" Id. at %3. 
Ti. faeL 1 f die 14 1 -1;lonth probationary period was composed of consecutive terms, 
tl len it w as eon lposed of <: "six consecutive tvv o-yeai [24 I i lontl l] tern is of pi obation r I d at 
*|[6. It is unlikely this is what the trial court intended since it/was purposefi illy imposing a 
long probationary period and., prior to Wallace, the probation statute was interpreted to 
allow up to 36-moi .:• !*.;m.-> ,. j,;oi),i;.o;: ;.-. at "; J - ^ ; ; u a , t .>ue \:.... . S-
h o ' K • • - S i . . - . - " ! , i • - - • > •. ; : r • -.- l .. , -, .• *' ' \ - :K. •. a o f 
the court or upoi> v.<>mp!eiion uiihou! \iolalion c('^^ inoiuhs probation in felon;, 
cases."): State v. McDonald, 20o^ * I App 86. rl° M ;?. H --;-; . iiwiding prohaiiun 
la!-" :* • ; ; • ' ' so ••'le'i:1 
(citation omitted)), cert, denied, 124 P.3d Zjl (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 
3 
979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting "maximum formal probation periods" for 
misdemeanors and felonies "are respectively twelve months and thirty-six months" 
(citation omitted)), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
Conversely, in this case, the trial court did not impose an arbitrary number of 
months in an effort to set "an extended period of probation." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^3. 
Instead, it imposed 108 months of probation specifically because "[t]hat's 36 months on 
each of the counts." R. 270:35. Again, in the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment, the 
trial court made clear that the 108-month probationary period consisted of "36 months on 
each count." R. 246. In fact, when rejecting Candedo's objection to the order of 
probation, the trial court revealed that it did not believe it had the power to impose a 
probationary term longer than 36 months for any one conviction. See R. 270:35. When 
defense counsel questioned the trial court's authority to impose the stated probationary 
period, the trial court responded, "I can give 36 months on each of three felonies that he's 
convicted of." R. 270:35. Thus, unlike Wallace, the record in this case shows the trial 
court imposed consecutive probationary terms of 36 months each. 
Because the record shows the trial court imposed consecutive probationary terms 
in this case, the issue concerning whether the trial court had the authority to impose 
consecutive terms of probation is preserved. The State, in its brief, argues the trial court 
imposed one long probationary term, rather than three consecutive terms, and concedes 
that the "trial court's response to defendant's inquiry preserved for appeal the question of 
the court's authority to impose a 108-month term of probation." Aple. Br. at 19 (citing 
State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (holding admissibility of evidence 
4 
preserved for appeal v '1 lere ti I a 1 coi n t cl lose not to f ind defei idant had waived issi ic, hi it 
instead considered claim on merits)). 
As discussed above, the record shows the trial court did not impose one long term 
oCprobadon In " three eonseuile e (eon1 o' >^ months i neli. 'NCC R. ?>HK .^70. ri Ii i n i 
ii ap'^arh from the record that the trial court believed it was not authorized to impose a 
probationer) tern uf more than 36 months for am one con\ ic;ien. See R. 270:35, Thus, 
w h e n ', a n u e - J o . iLi^ .a ioueo l:\^ . ; . ; t i U K J , - ;:<•*.•::: ; ; p.- -v u u .,iaLv.„ e .;*\. ^ :. i: 
period, he was ' .n. '>Lj.ne >'••. v: n . • ••• belief h;;u it could impose consecutive terms 
of probation. See R. 270:35. According . the Stale's concession that Candedo's 
"inquiry preserved for appeal the question
 y.\ ihe Cwu,-; s anthorii\ to impose a . wN-n - iin 
term of proi4.;«- • e / ;•:'•<•. ••!*•• ' • •"•'• ^ • '•••--." j — 
the trial court had authority to impose three consecutive terms of probation amounting to 
a total of 108 months of probation. • 
type of isbue iln^ Cuurl should address under rule 22(c) oi the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 22(e) is not so "'"narrowly circumscribed"" as to prevent this ^un t fi on I 
correcting an megai sentence. A;-ie. i:\. a: _.i» uiiaiions omitted;. :u::<u. :i i. .A\ so 
narrowly circumsci ibed as to prev ent parties from abi ising the n lie by,, for exan mle, using 
it to "attack [the] underlying conviction," State v. Telford, 2002 HI 51,17, 48 f. kl 228 
(citations omitted), or to appeal "'run-of-the-milP errors" without filing a timely notice of 
a p p e a i . Male_>_._ 1 i i o i k e l s u i i . . • M - . . V . • • ; - " : • -f ;. i n d c - . * i-
5 
properly invoked rule 22(e) because he is challenging the constitutional legality of the 
trial court's order of probation. See Aplt. Br. at 25-27. 
As explained above, the trial court in this case, unlike the trial court in Wallace, 
imposed three consecutive terms of probation in order to attain the desired 108-month 
probationary period. See R. 246; 270:35; cf Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ffl[2-3, 6. Because, 
as explained in Candedo's opening brief, the Legislature has not granted courts authority 
to impose consecutive terms of probation and has not provided guidance as to how 
consecutive probationary terms should be managed, the trial court's order for probation 
was "'manifestly' illegal" and should be corrected on appeal.1 See Utah R. Grim. P. 
22(e); Aplt. Br. at 10-18. 
B. This Court Should Review This Issue as a Matter of First Impression Because 
It Was Not Decided by Our Supreme Court in Wallace. 
In Wallace, our supreme court did not decide whether consecutive terms of 
probation are permissible under the Utah Code. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^ |4, 6. To 
the contrary, it declined to reach the issue because the trial court, in that case, "entered an 
order for one 144-month term of probation, not six consecutive terms." IcL As explained 
in Candedo's opening brief, the question of consecutive terms of probation remains 
relevant after Wallace because consecutive terms of probation create procedural 
1
 In his opening brief, in order to show trial courts do not have authority to impose 
consecutive terms of probation, Candedo argued the consecutive sentencing statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003), refers exclusively to imprisonment. See Aplt. Br. at 13-
14, n.2. Supplemental to this argument, Candedo refers this Court to State v. Anderson, 
2007 UT App 68, 157 P.3d 809, which was issued after Candedo filed his opening brief. 
In Anderson, echoing Candedo's argument from the opening brief, this Court noted that 
in the consecutive sentencing statute, "the legislature consistently uses the word served to 
mean incarcerated," not to mean on probation. Id. at 1fl[7-9. 
6 
difficulties beyond those created by long single terms of probation. See Aplt. Br. at 17-
18. Specifically, if a probationer violates his probation during the second term of 
probation, has he successfully completed his first term of probation? See id. Likewise, if 
a probationer violates his probation during the first term of probation, can his second 
term of probation be revoked, even though he has not violated it? See id. These 
problems have not been addressed by the Utah Legislature apd are relevant in this case 
because the trial court ordered Candedo to serve consecutive terms of probation. See 
supra at Part LA. Thus, because neither this Court nor our supreme court has decided 
whether trial courts are authorized to impose consecutive probationary terms, this Court 
should address the issue here. 
C Because the Trial Court Was Not Authorized to Impose Consecutive Terms of 
Probation, This Court Should Reverse and Remand to the Trial Court With 
an Order to Run Candedo's 36-Month Probationary Terms Concurrently. 
On appeal, Candedo is not asking for a new sentence. He believes the trial court's 
original imposition of 36 months probation for each count was legal. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) ("Probation may be terminated at any time at the 
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony . . . cases"). But, he argues, the trial court was without authority to run the three 
terms of probation consecutively. See Aplt. Br. at 10-18; si^ pra Part I. Thus, the proper 
remedy is not to remand for resentencing. Rather, as Candedo has requested, the proper 
remedy is to reverse and remand to the trial court with an order to run the 36-month terms 
of probation concurrently. Aplt. Br. at 28. 
7 
To hold otherwise would improperly punish Candedo for exercising his 
constitutional right to appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (2003) ("Where a 
conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review . . .
 ? the court shall not impose 
a new sentence for the same offense . . . which is more severe than the prior sentence less 
the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied."); State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 88 
(Utah 1991) (noting purpose behind preventing harsher sentences after reversal "is to 
prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a 
harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible 
error in his conviction"); Taylorsville City v. Adkins, 2006 UT App 374,1(13, 145 P.3d 
1161 C"[A] person's decision to avail himself of the right to appeal guaranteed under art. 
VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by making it conditional on 
taking the risk of a harsher sentence after the second trial.'5' (quoting Wisden v. District 
Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984))). As explained by our supreme court, a "second 
sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-201, or in their magnitude." State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 181 
(Utah 1981). "This means that no new element of a sentence can be added and that no 
element can be augmented in magnitude. It also precludes justifying an increase in one 
element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in another element. . . . This is because 
the possibility of such a tradeoff could act as a deterrent to appeal by an individual 
defendant." Id 
If, however, this Court determines the correct remedy is to reverse and remand for 
resentencing, then this Court should address Point II in Candedo's opening brief because, 
8 
under Wallace's interpretation of the probation statute, the trial court on remand will be 
able to impose a "single term of 108 months" of probation, Aple. Br. at 17, which, as 
argued in Point II, violates substantive due process. 
IL THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF 
CANDEDO'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ISSUE AND 
SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE PROBATION 
STATUTE, AS INTERPRETED BY WALLACE, VIOLATES 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
As explained in Candedo's opening brief, the legislatively-stated purpose of 
probation is rehabilitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003) (defining 
probation as an "act of grace"); Aplt. Br. at 15, 19-20 (additional citations). The 
probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, violates substantive due process because it is 
not rationally related to achieving this purpose. See Aplt. Br. at 20-24. Specifically, as 
interpreted by Wallace, the probation statute "does not imppse any limitation on the 
length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^[13. This 
is counterproductive to rehabilitation because long probationary terms, such as 
Candedo's, undermine rehabilitation by reinforcing the defendant's belief that he is an 
outsider whom society distrusts and is determined to see fail. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. 
As explained below, Candedo is not required to identify a fundamental right before 
making his substantive due process argument because he relies on the rational basis test, 
rather than the heightened scrutiny test. See infra Part II.A. Moreover, this Court should 
hold the probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, violates substantive due process 
because it is not rationally related to rehabilitation, which is the legislatively-stated 
purpose of probation. See infra Part II.B. Finally, this Court should reach the merits of 
9 
this issue because our supreme court's issuance of Wallace, after Candedo was sentenced, 
makes review of this issue appropriate under either rule 22(e) or exceptional 
circumstances. See infra Part II.C. 
A. Candedo Is Not Required to Identify a Fundamental Right Before Making 
His Substantive Due Process Argument 
Candedo does not have to make a "'threshold' showing" that the probation statute 
"implicates a fundamental right before arguing that the statute has no reasonable relation 
to a legitimate state interest." Aple. Br. at 28. If a statute implicates "fundamental 
rights," then it is subject "to a 'heightened degree of scrutiny'" under the due process 
clause. Tindlev v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisU 2005 UT 30,^28, 116 P.3d 295 (citation 
omitted); see Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91,p0, 103 P.3d 135 (explaining "rational basis 
test is replaced by a more stringent test in cases where [substantive due process] rights 
impacted by the legislation are deemed to be 'fundamental'" (citation omitted)). Under 
this heightened degree of scrutiny, the government may not infringe on a fundamental 
liberty interest '"unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.'" Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted). 
Alternatively, if a statute "does not infringe upon a fundamental right," then it is 
not subject "to a 'heightened degree of scrutiny,'" but it is still subject to the restraints of 
the due process clause. Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ffl[28-29. Specifically, it is subject "to 
rational basis review." Id.; see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 at 767 n.9 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (noting if interest is not fundamental, then "rational basis justification is 
required," and not "the 'complex balancing' that heightened scrutiny entails"); Judd, 
10 
2004 UT 91 at }^30 ("Generally, we apply a rational basis test in substantive due process 
cases," except "where the rights impacted by the legislation are deemed to be 
'fundamental.'" (citation omitted)). Under rational basis review, the statute will only "be 
upheld if it has '"a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [is] neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory.'"" Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ^28-29 (citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
In this case, Candedo argues the probation statute violates substantive due process 
because, as interpreted by Wallace, it is not rationally related to the legislatively-stated 
purpose of probation. See Aplt. Br. at 19-24. Because Candedo has invoked the rational 
basis test, rather than the heightened scrutiny test, he is not required to identify a 
fundamental interest. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ffl[28-29. 
Regardless, it is noteworthy that the interest at stake in this case is not probation, 
as the State claims, but liberty itself. Probation severely liniits a person's freedom, 
impinges on his constitutional rights (most blatantly, the rights guaranteed by the first, 
fourth, and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution), and constantly threatens 
him with incarceration. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1; Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 
2193, 2197 (2006) (noting "probationers 'do not enjoy "the absolute liberty'" of other 
citizens" (citations omitted)); United States v. Nachtigal 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (per 
curiam) (holding "liberty infringement [is] caused by a term of probation"); Blanton v. 
City of North Las Vegas, Nev., 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (noting that although less 
severe than imprisonment, "probation . . . may engender 'a significant infringement of 
personal freedom'" (citation omitted)); Griffin v. Wisconsin 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) 
11 
(noting probationers have only "' conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of 
special [probation] restrictions'" (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. 
Cowdell 626 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1981) (noting probationers have "limited procedural 
rights" and a "restricted . . . right to personal liberty"); R. 246. 
As interpreted by Wallace, Utah's probation statute allows trial courts to impose 
probation, and its accompanying liberty restrictions, for as long as they like, even for the 
rest of the probationer's life. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^14 (concluding "our law 
currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court may 
impose"). This is true of all criminal offenses, even infractions. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) ("Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of 
the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class 
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions.") with Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at J^13 (holding "provision regarding 36 months 
[and 12 months] is nearly meaningless, since the court may terminate probation 'at any 
time'"). Such lengthy probationary periods implicate a fundamental interest in liberty 
and, although not necessary because Candedo has met the rational basis test, this Court 
may impose a heightened degree of scrutiny as it reviews the constitutionality of the 
probation statute. 
B. The Probation Statute, As Interpreted By Wallace, Is Not Rationally Related 
to Rehabilitation, Which Is the Legislatively-Stated Purpose of Probation. 
As explained in detail in Candedo's opening brief, the legislatively-stated purpose 
of probation is rehabilitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003) (defining 
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probation as an "act of grace"); Aplt. Br. at 15, 19-20 (additional citations). Long 
probationary terms, however, are counterproductive to rehabilitation because they 
reinforce the defendant's belief that he is an outsider whom society distrusts, does not 
want, and is determined to see fail. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Thus, the probation statute, as 
interpreted by Wallace, is not rationally related to achieving the legislative goal of 
rehabilitation because it "does not impose any limitation on the length of probationary 
term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at 1J13; see Aplt. Br. at 20-24. 
The State does not challenge Candedo's argument that the probation statute, as 
interpreted by Wallace, is not rationally related to achieving the goal of rehabilitation. 
See Aple. Br. at 21-32. It also does not contradict the research presented by Candedo, 
which shows long probationary periods are counterproductive to rehabilitation. Id. 
Instead, the State claims, without citation, that a second goal of probation is "to enable a 
probationer to fulfill his obligation to make full restitution t^ ) crime victims." Aple. Br. at 
29. The Utah Code, however, indicates no such legislative purpose. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (defining probation as an "act of grace by the court suspending the 
imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions"). 
Rather, the Code defines probation and restitution as separate tools with separate 
purposes in separate sections of the Code. See State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1205-09 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). Specifically, the guidelines for imposing probation and defining 
2
 Later in its brief, the State cites State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), for the proposition that this Court has recognized 
the payment of restitution as a goal of probation. Aple. Br. at 32. In Dickey, however, 
this Court said restitution has a "separate purpose" from probation, and only discussed 
the goals of restitution, not the goals of probation. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209. 
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probationary terms are provided by the probation statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. 
Whereas, the "criteria and procedures" for assessing and imposing restitution are 
"provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(4)(b)(Supp. 2006). 
Through these separate sections, the Code dictates separate goals for probation and 
restitution. As explained in the opening brief, the Legislature has said the purpose of 
probation is rehabilitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (explaining probation is 
an "act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted 
offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions"); Aplt. Br. at 15, 19-20. It is a 
discretionary order and is generally reserved for "young or unhardened offenders]" who 
would benefit from "an opportunity to rehabilitate [themselves] without institutional 
confinement." Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); see Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(2) (saying trial court "may sentence" a defendant "to probation" or "to 
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (saying trial court "may, after imposing 
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation"). 
While restitution may also have rehabilitative qualities, rehabilitation is not the 
main goal of restitution. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209. Rather, the traditional goal of 
restitution is "repaying] victims," and subsidiary goals may include "punishment, 
deterrence," and rehabilitation. Id. (citations omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(c) (Supp. 2007) (listing "rehabilitative effect on the defendant" as one of several 
considerations for "determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution"). But see Aple. Br. at 31. Thus, restitution is not reserved for special cases; 
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rather, it is imposed in many cases and is mandatory whenever "a [defendant] is 
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Si^pp. 2007). 
True, the probation statute says that u[w]hile on probation, and as a condition of 
probation," a trial court may, among other things, order a defendant to "make restitution 
or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with [the CVRA]." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix). The use of the phrase ^[wjhile on probation," 
however, indicates that by giving trial courts authority to make restitution a condition of 
probation while the defendant is on probation, the Legislature did not intend to give trial 
courts the much broader authority to extend a probationary period until restitution is paid. 
See Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205-09. This conclusion is further supported by the language 
of the probation statute as a whole and by the language of the CVRA. 
As explained in the opening brief, it appears from the language of the probation 
statute that our Legislature intended to impose a statutory limitation on the length of 
probation of "36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i); see Aplt. Br. at 22-23. In many cases, 36 months is not going 
to be enough time to pay the ordered restitution. Realizing this, the Legislature could 
have allowed for longer probationary periods in such cases. It did not, however. Instead, 
it said that if, during the probationary period, the probationer violates a term of probation, 
including restitution, then the probationary period can be modified, extended, or revoked. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a). If, on the other hand, the probationer successfully 
completes the probationary period, then probation should be terminated and the 
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probationer should be granted his freedom. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i); see 
Aplt. Br. at 22-23. At that point, if "there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable," then "the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant 
on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account 
receivable." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). 
Likewise, the CVRA, as its name indicates, addresses restitution. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-38a-101 to -502 (2003 & Supp. 2007). It does not provide guidance as to 
whether to place a defendant on probation or define how long a probationary term should 
last.3 Id. In fact, in the "Enforcement and Collection" part of the CVRA, where the 
Legislature could have listed probation as an option for enforcing restitution, if that was 
its intent, the Legislature did the opposite. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-501, -502. 
There, the Legislature said a trial court "may impose sanctions against the defendant" if 
he "defaults in the payment of a judgment for restitution or any installment ordered." 
J
 In particular, section 77-38a-302 addresses how restitution is to be calculated. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302. Among the many factors to be considered when calculating the 
amount of restitution to be paid, it lists "the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to other obligations of the 
defendant," and "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i), (iii). 
The State claims that the term "other conditions," as used in section 77-3 8a-
302(5)(b), (c), "reasonably suggests an extended period of probation to accomplish a 
burdensome restitutionary obligation." Aple. Br. at 30-31. This claim is unsupported by 
any citation. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating briefs must contain reasoned analysis 
based upon relevant legal authority); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,^7, 17 P.3d 1122 
("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate briefing." 
(citations omitted)); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (declaring issue 
inadequately briefed when the "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). As explained in the body of 
this section, it is also contrary to the language of both the probation statute and the 
CVRA. See supra Part IIB. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-501(1). But, importantly, a "court may not impose a sanction" 
if "the sanction would extend the defendant's term of probation or parole." Utah Code 
Ann. §77-38a-501(2)(b). 
Thus, the legislatively-stated goal of probation is rehabilitation and, as explained 
in Candedo5s opening brief, the probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, violates 
substantive due process because it is not rationally related to achieving this goal. 
C. Our Supreme Court's Issuance of Wallace after Candedo Was Sentenced 
Makes Review of This Issue On Appeal Appropriate Under Either Rule 22(e) 
or Exceptional Circumstances. 
Wallace held the probation statute, as written, "does not impose any limitation on 
the length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^ fl3. 
It did not address the follow-up question as to whether the probation statute, as 
interpreted, violates substantive due process. Id. at ^5-16. This is the issue Candedo 
raises on appeal. If the probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, does violate 
substantive due process, then Candedo's 108-month probationary period constitutes an 
illegal sentence that is subject to correction, regardless of preservation, under rule 22(e). 
Likewise, our supreme court's issuance of Wallace after Candedo was sentenced 
created exceptional circumstances warranting review of this issue. At the time Candedo 
was sentenced, Utah case law interpreted the probation statute as imposing a 36-month 
term limit on probation. See State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86,1J19, 110 P.3d 149 
(holding probation statute "limits probation for any particular class C misdemeanor to 
twelve months" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (2003))), cert, denied, 124 
P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting 
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"maximum formal probation periods" for misdemeanors and felonies "are respectively 
twelve months and thirty-six months" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (8)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1992))). Thus, "at the time o f his sentencing, Candedo "had no particular need to" argue 
the probation statute violated substantive due process because it had not yet been 
interpreted to impose no "limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose." 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); R. 270. Now, however, review of 
Candedo's claim is crucial because the trial court's lengthy 108-month term of probation, 
while appropriate under Wallace's interpretation of the probation statute, violates 
substantive due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Candedo respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand his case to the trial 
court with an order to run his 36-month probationary terms concurrently, or to declare 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i), as interpreted by Wallace, unconstitutional. 
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